Chemin de fer à haute vitesse
- Montréal doit privilégier le corridor Montréal-New York

Gaëtan Lafrance a récemment remis en question le choix du JetTrain de Bombardier dans le projet du corridor Québec-Windsor. Avec ses 200 km/h, ce train fait pâle figure à côté des TGV européens qui font plus de 350 km/h. De plus, souligne-t-il, si les TGV sont électriques et ne polluent pas, le JetTrain, lui, a un moteur thermique qui pollue. Tous auront compris que le choix du JetTrain a été dicté par des considérations économiques et non pas écologiques.

Bien plus que le choix du type de train, les Montréalais devraient remettre en question l'idée de développer un corridor ferroviaire aussi peu dense que celui de Québec à Windsor. La non-rentabilité d'un TGV ultra-rapide dans ce corridor s'explique avant tout par la faible densité de population qu'il serait appelé à desservir. D'où l'obligation de laisser de côté le lièvre TGV au profit de la tortue JetTrain.

Le problème avec le projet de corridor Québec-Windsor, c'est sans doute que personne n'en parlerait si la frontière canado-américaine n'existait pas. Dans une Amérique du Nord sans frontière, ce projet n'aurait aucune chance de tenir la route. À l'échelle du continent, l'axe Québec-Montréal-Toronto-Windsor est marginal depuis déjà longtemps. Il l'est même devenu pour Montréal elle-même depuis la création de l'ALÉNA.

Dans l'évolution des grandes métropoles de notre continent, il y a un phénomène généralement ignoré ou du moins négligé par les Montréalais et c'est celui de la soudure qui est en train de se faire entre les agglomérations nordiques de la Fall Line, cette ligne de faille qui part de New York et va jusqu'à l'Alabama en passant par Philadelphie, Baltimore, Washington, Richmond (Virginie), Macon (Géorgie) et Colombus (Géorgie). Les tissus urbains de New York et de Philadelphie sont en train de se souder, tout comme ceux de Baltimore et de Washington. Certaines données internationales prennent déjà en compte ce phénomène en fusionnant les populations de New York et de Philadelphie et en faisant de même avec celles de Baltimore et de Washington. Bien plus, les tissus urbains de Philadelphie et de Baltimore sont aussi sur le point de se rejoindre. L'immense conurbation linéaire qui va de New York à Washington compte aujourd'hui quelque 27 millions d'habitants. Cela est considérable par rapport aux 9,5 millions d'habitants de l'ensemble Toronto-London-Windsor-Detroit.

31 millions d'habitants reliés

Pour une distance équivalant à celle entre Québec et Windsor (soit 1200 kilomètres), un chemin de fer à haute vitesse pourrait relier Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphie, New York, Albany, Montréal et même Tremblant. Une telle liaison desservirait une population totale de plus de 31 millions d'habitants, alors qu'une liaison Québec-Windsor n'en desservirait que 13,5 millions, soit 2,3 fois moins. Par ailleurs, la topographie, qui donne naissance à la conurbation de la Fall Line, favorise depuis toujours une liaison entre Montréal et New York grâce aux vallées de l'Hudson et du Richelieu.

L'axe Washington-New York-Montréal est inscrit dans la géographie, mais il a aussi un sens plus élevé. Ces trois villes ont en commun une vocation internationale. Elles sont sans doute celles qui regroupent le plus d'organismes internationaux en Amérique du Nord. Depuis les débuts de l'ALÉNA, cet axe a aussi un sens économique et commercial de plus en plus prononcé. Même du point de vue touristique, il séduit. La région de Tremblant pourrait fort bien, grâce à un TGV desservant le corridor Washington-New York-Montréal-Tremblant, devenir la destination naturelle des vacanciers de la conurbation de la Fall Line à la recherche de pentes enneigées l'hiver et d'air plus frais l'été.

Montréal ne devrait pas courir deux lièvres à la fois. Entre le corridor Québec-Windsor et le corridor Montréal-New York, il faut privilégier le second. Et entre un corridor Montréal-New York et un corridor Tremblant-Montréal-New York-Washington plus ambitieux, il ne faut vraisemblablement pas se contenter du premier. Dans ce dernier corridor, le choix d'un vrai TGV s'imposerait de lui-même et le JetTrain pourrait être réservé à la desserte du mini-corridor Toronto-Windsor. Si jamais le nouveau gouvernement du Québec recherche un projet enivrant et vraisemblablement rentable, celui-là devrait attirer son attention.

Sommet économique Québec-New York à l'automne

Le Québec et l'État de New York tiendront en novembre, à Montréal, un sommet portant sur les échanges économiques. C'est ce qu'ont convenu le premier ministre Jean Charest et le gouverneur George Pataki, qui ont eu un entretien jeudi matin dans la métropole américaine. M. Charest a qualifié la rencontre avec le gouverneur de «cordiale et chaleureuse».

M. Charest a déclaré qu'au cours de la rencontre, M. Pataki avait ramené sur le tapis le vieux projet de train rapide Montréal-New York. Le premier ministre québécois a indiqué que le projet de TGV, un projet «de très grande envergure», allait être remis sur la table et ré-étudié, tout en reconnaissant qu'il devrait soulever beaucoup de difficultés, notamment aux États-Unis, à cause de la densité de la population du côté américain de la frontière.

Jeux olympiques

M. Charest a précisé qu'il n'avait pu, faute de temps, aborder avec M. Patakis la question du projet de proposition conjointe de l'État de New York et du Québec pour la présentation des Jeux olympiques d'hiver. Il a toutefois ajouté que le comité mis sur pied par Richard Legendre, l'ancien ministre des Sports dans le conseil des ministres du Parti québécois, pour étudier ce projet était maintenu. Le premier ministre a déclaré que le Sommet Québec-New York de novembre serait l'occasion de déterminer s'il vaut la peine d'aller de l'avant avec ce projet.

M. Charest s'est dit tout à fait enchanté également de sa rencontre de mercredi avec le secrétaire d'État américain, Colin Powell, avec qui il a abordé le dossier du bois d'oeuvre. Il dit avoir apprécié l'ouverture de M. Powell sur cette question.

Cette rencontre entre un premier ministre québécois et un secrétaire d'État américain était une première, très positive selon M. Charest, qui s'inscrit dans une tendance nouvelle. Le premier ministre a rappelé que ses homologues albertain Ralph Klein et ontarien Ernie Eves avaient eu de semblables contacts récemment. Pour M. Charest, il faut dorénavant occuper cet espace qui revient au Québec, dans le respect des compétences du gouvernement fédéral.

M. Charest, dont c'était le premier déplacement à l'étranger depuis son assermentation comme premier ministre, a révélé avoir reçu une invitation à prononcer un discours devant le Foreign Policy Association. Il sera donc de retour dans la métropole américaine à l'automne.

Le TGV sur la glace

Le gouvernement fédéral met sur la glace le projet de train rapide reliant Québec, Toronto et Windsor. Le ministre des Transports, David Collenette, veut plus de temps pour analyser le projet de la firme Lynx, évalué à 11 milliards $. Même s'il ne peut fixer d'échéance, le ministre Collenette se défend de vouloir enterrer le projet. Entre-temps, il compte former un comité pour discuter du problème d'achalandage dans le corridor Québec-Windsor.

What we can do for Israel

Leading the Way: The following is a partial text of an address by I.H. Asper, chairman of CanWest Global Communications Corp., at the Jabotinsky Memorial Evening last night in Toronto.

Israel is now entitled to call a halt to its obligations under the road map, based on Palestinian non-compliance -- and it should do exactly that. But, of course, it is not compatible with what President George W. Bush wants, heading into an election year. So, perhaps Israel will have to continue playing the game until President Bush finally realizes he has been snookered and is able to throw up his hands and say: "Well, we did our best, we tried, but the two sides are irreconcilable and they must obviously go at it until someone wins and someone loses."

It is even possible that all of the parties are just "acting out" and adjourning the war to a "more convenient time."

What should Israel do?

Israel has already paid with 1,000 dead citizens and 5,000 maimed and wounded for the failure of the Oslo process. It cannot afford to repeat that mistake. Thus, Israel should not agree to release Palestinian prisoners who are connected to terrorism. Objective data indicate that one out of every two that were released during the Oslo process came back as a terrorist, including Mohammed Atta, who was released at president Bill Clinton's insistence, only to immigrate to the United States by way of crashing his airplane into the World Trade Center on 9/11.

Israel must continue to build its security fence to keep the terrorists of the future out. Good fences do make good neighbours. The example of the physical separation of the Greeks and Turks on Cyprus, where peace has reigned for 50 years because of that separation, provides the proof of the value of the separation fence. But Israel should not accept the fence as its final border with whatever Palestinian entity emerges and, therefore, Israeli troops should be stationed on both sides of the fence until a final resolution has been mutually agreed upon.

Israel should also put forward a plan and begin insisting on that plan saying that since there are 1,200,000 Arabs living in the Israeli state, at least that number of Jews ought to be permitted to live in whatever Palestinian state emerges. There is no right or rationale in dismantling Jewish settlement towns and cities, even if they are ultimately located in the Palestinian state.

And Israel should renounce the exhortations by external parties that it should prop up (Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud) Abbas in the hope that he will deliver. This is the same trap they fell into with Oslo in propping up (Palestinian President Yasser) Arafat to enable him to deliver that which he had no intention of delivering, as well as no ability to deliver as Abbas has already confirmed with regard to breaking up the terrorist structures.

What can Israel's Canadian supporters do?

Can Canadians play any role in this international and interminable conflict? What we can do is demand an end to the dishonest reporting by our media. The refusal of the CBC to call a terrorist a terrorist, the taken-as-given that there is a "cycle of violence," when there is no such thing, and the call for only "proportionate response" to terrorist activities is nothing short of odious.

The media reporting on the release of prisoners is dishonest unless it clearly states that this demand was not a condition of the road map and is, therefore, a non issue, as is the so-called issue of the security fence.

We and our Christian Zionist friends can ensure that the Canadian public and our politicians know the facts, the history and can recognize the myriad of myths spun by Palestinian propagandists and their compliant media mouthpieces. We can educate our children and our friends as to which are the myths and what are the facts of this conflict, so that they, like all reasonable supporters of Israel, can become ambassadors on its behalf.

And what can Canada do?

First, you may ask who cares what Canada does. We are a small country, not a military presence, and a bit player on the international stage. But that's not true. Canada is seen as a rational, human rights-oriented country, neutral in the international economic and political competition for oil, trade and cultural imperialism. Our credibility with the United States, the European Union and the United Nations is greater than our numbers would suggest, given our significant prestige in the advancement of human rights throughout the world. Therefore, Canada has an influential role to play.

We are about to elect a new prime minister and we are entitled to call for a complete review of Canada's foreign policy, and nowhere can we be more effective in dealing with the position of Canada vis-a-vis Israel as at the UN, where our voting record is unacceptable.

We must demand that our government's CRTC agency refuse to license the broadcast of an Arab government-owned, anti-Israel, anti-Semitic television station, Al Jazeera, on our regulated broadcast system. But if, in the name of free speech, it should be licensed, then the law should be strengthened to ensure that the cable and satellite companies which carry it are personally liable for any hate incitement they broadcast, or any defamation they publish.

We must ask our country, as the chair of the Madrid Conference on Middle East refugees, to put on the table, and not permit it to be removed, the compensation for the Jewish refugees from Arab lands, and not allow the word "refugees" to apply only to Palestinian refugees, but to the Jewish refugees as well.

And finally, we must ask that Canada demand that the United Nations treat Israel as a full-fledged member of the UN, to be, like every other nation, not a pariah nation, but one admitted to the mainstream of all aspects of international affairs at the United Nations.

This is very little to ask, but would be much to receive.

The Middle East

William Kitchen: fisherman's friend

Éditorial - Since the mid-'90s, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) has been stripping hundreds of non-native fishermen of their livelihood through a program that reserves commercial fishing rights for natives. The DFO's "pilot sales program" has no basis in treaty or equity. Nor does it strengthen aboriginal communities or accomplish any other vital policy objective. It is simply a race-based preference that transfers wealth from individual non-native fishermen to their Indian colleagues.

This week, we are happy to report, the program was struck down. Five years ago, a group of 130 non-native B.C. fishermen staged a "protest fishery" during a period when the Musqueam, Tsawwassen and Burrard Indian bands had been granted an exclusive right to fish for Fraser River sockeye salmon. On Monday, Judge William Kitchen of the B.C. Provincial Court stayed charges of unlawful fishing against the protesters, upholding their claim that the pilot sales program for aboriginals violates the Charter of Rights and Freedoms' protection against racial discrimination. We applaud Judge Kitchen for having the courage to point out the obvious. His scathing analysis not only impugns the DFO's policy, but also a great slew of similarly misguided preference programs run by Ottawa.

The roots of the B.C. protest go to the Supreme Court of Canada's 1990 decision in R. v. Sparrow, which affirmed the right of Indian bands to take fish for food, social and ceremonial purposes in otherwise regulated fisheries. The right conferred did not extend to commercial fishing; but bureaucrats nonetheless seized on the judgment to launch ambitious efforts at social engineering.

To this day, no one has any clear idea what the pilot sales program -- run under the auspices of the broader Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy (AFS) -- was supposed to accomplish. Some say it was meant to remedy past discrimination or promote economic equality; others say to vindicate treaty rights or the government's "fiduciary" obligations to Indians. In 1993, John Crosbie said the point was to thwart aboriginal poaching. Since natives had established illegal fisheries anyway, the then-fisheries and oceans minister's odd logic went, it only made sense to legitimize the crime. In R. v. Kapp et. al, Judge Kitchen demolishes all of these rationales by disclosing what the policy has actually wrought. His decision makes clear that the pilot sales program is not only overtly discriminatory, it also served no valid sociological or economic purpose.

Consider that, even before the AFS was instituted in the early '90s, aboriginals were already over-represented in B.C.'s salmon fishery. In fact, some of the same fishermen taking part in the aboriginal pilot program were double-dipping in the regular, non-native, fishery that followed. A few, it is even alleged, triple-dipped, freezing their off-the-books "food, social and ceremonial" catch for later sale. As for non-native fishermen, they seethed during the period when natives monopolized the waters. Many left the fishery entirely or were forced to take second jobs. Though other factors -- most notably a decline in the fish population -- were at play, many non-natives understandably focused their bitterness on the DFO's Indian policy.

Indeed, one of the saddest aspects of the pilot sales program is the way it has torn apart native/non-native relations -- as one would expect from any government policy that enriches some and impoverishes others according to arbitrary criteria. Michael Forrest, a 54-year-old mariner quoted in Monday's judgment, testified that in the pre-AFS days, natives and non-natives "used to be a community. Used to hang nets together. Drag for snags together. Fix boats together ... Help one another out at the waterfront." But now, "there is basically zero communication." According to another gillnetter, "these different fisheries that are being granted to Natives and stuff have caused hard feelings and guys have got arguments and fights on the boat. And actually, in some cases, fist fights and stuff and now the Native boats are pretty well just Native and the white ones are all white."

Readers may note that we have spoken of "non-native" -- rather than "white" - fishermen. That's because many of the people victimized by the pilot sales program are of Asian ancestry. Notable in this respect is Richard Nomura, a third-generation Canadian fisherman who traces his roots to Japan. During the 1940s, Mr. Nomura's parents and grandparents were sent to internment camps in Alberta and had their property confiscated. "I'm a Canadian, right?" he says. "I mean, my father and mother were born here ... In '85 they got an apology from the government that said that they were committed to ... the equality and justice of all people by all races, and then all of a sudden they come back and throw a policy like this."

The real scandal, of course, is that this DFO policy has been implemented for years, and most Canadians don't seem to have been much bothered by it. Apparently our government has been so successful in spreading the conceit that aboriginal rights trump every other principle that the whole country is willing to turn a blind eye to overtly racist policies. We can only be thankful that there are people like Judge Kitchen -- and the fishermen who took their case before him -- to apply some common sense and moral clarity.

As for the DFO, it wisely announced on Tuesday that it would be cancelling its native-only commercial fishery. Various aboriginal fishermen and leaders have already announced they will flout the new policy. We hope Ottawa and the local police deal with these law-breakers as they would any non-native scofflaw. If there is one lesson to be drawn from Judge Kitchen's landmark judgment, it is that our government should not be in the business of racial discrimination.

The decision in R. v. Kapp et. al can be found at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca. Once at the site, enter the file number -- 108246 -- in the "judgment database" field, top-left on the Web page.

A race-based fishery stinks of racism

VANCOUVER - The 10-year-old race-based commercial salmon fishery in British Columbia has been an unmitigated disaster in terms of relations between natives and non-natives, not to mention economic hardship for thousands of fishermen. It has also been an unbelievable example of the democratic deficit inherent in the elected dictatorship that is Ottawa. A ruling by a courageous Provincial Court Judge this week has put a stop to it for now, but we have not seen the end of this issue.

The ruling concerned the "Pilot Sales Program" of the "Aboriginal Fishing Strategy" (AFS). This program, put simply, was to allow Indian fishermen to get in ahead of all others on taking and selling commercial salmon. As a result, this special fishery has taken anywhere from 15% of the available resource in some years to a high of 50% in 2001. It is a big deal.

In such a highly competitive industry, days out on the water for some, ahead of everyone else, grinds away at the guts of those marooned and watching from the beach. In a short salmon year they might get nothing. And many native fishermen are allowed to "double dip" by joining the regular commercial openings if they happen to have a dry year.

Justice William Kitchen's ruling called the program "grossly unfair," "counterproductive," a "tremendous cost to society" and "analogous to racial discrimination." Justice Brian Saunderson in the same court in an earlier case at Campbell River called it a "policy of political correctness," saying the government agency has lost its moral authority and "the right to demand the respect of the public."

It is worth knowing how all of this happened. In British Columbia, Indians and others -- Japanese, and more recently Vietnamese, have become major participants -- have fished side by side in peace since Confederation and before. Natives have always had a special right to take fish for food purposes outside the usual rules. Beyond that everyone was equal, and indeed the Indian boats were often the fleet highliners, and comprised about a third of the industry. Racial relations were harmonious. People served on boats together, went to church together and kids played with their neighbours.

No more. In 1992 the AFS hit like a bomb seemingly from nowhere and divided Indians against the rest. But it wasn't from nowhere. It came from base political calculation.

In 1990, we had the military standoff at Oka. This spooked the federal government no end. Meanwhile, Meech Lake was disintegrating and Ottawa was looking for ways to cobble together the Charlottetown Accord. The increasingly media-savvy and influential native Indians had to be brought aboard somehow. "How do we piece them off?" was the question. In the 1992 Charlottetown Accord the response was a proposed third order of (race-based) government. Additional incentives were offered by region, such as the promise of Nunavut in the north. In British Columbia, I say it was the AFS.

And thus was created a special commercial salmon fishery for Indians. The priority for taking salmon now stood as follows: First let enough fish go upstream for conservation. The next shot was for for aboriginal food, social, and ceremonial purposes. And then came this whole new and much larger category -- the AFS quota -- before anyone else got a shot. Non-native commercial fishermen went nuts, but to no avail. There are only a few thousand of them and British Columbia doesn't vote for the Liberals.

The justifications were disingenuous, to say the least. One Fisheries minister claimed the new program was to control poaching. Hardly. Since the new program (and the food fishery) was to be controlled by a new class of "Native Guardian" appointed by the chiefs, and the regular Department of Fisheries and Oceans (universally know as DFO) enforcement officials were to be withdrawn, this was putting the fox in charge of the henhouse. (Justice Kitchen found the program, in fact, encouraged poaching.)

The federal government then claimed the program was to help native communities, but again Justice Kitchen noted that the individual fishermen designated by the band are "completely on their own and keep all the profits for themselves," and there was no evidence that any of the money went to any program "to deal with any of the real disadvantages" of the bands.

The federal government over the years has systematically misrepresented the 1991 Supreme Court of Canada "Sparrow" decision as requiring an Indian commercial fishery. It did no such thing, and in 1995 in "Vander Peet" the court explicitly ruled out such a special entitlement, Ottawa, however, maintained its position.

These government justifications have been a mixture of ignorance and deceit; I know not which is worse.

The B.C. Fisheries Survival Coalition was formed in 1993. They launched their first litigation that year, and government manoeuvres postponed any first decision until 1998, when a judge found MP John Cummins guilty on a technicality for taking part in an unsanctioned fishery protesting the AFS -- but found the AFS illegal and gave Cummins an absolute discharge.

The Survival Coalition escalated activity. At the first AFS opening after the Cummins discharge, 240 non-native boats went fishing and were arrested and charged. Through a human tragedy in the court system -- another judge heard six weeks of trial but fell too ill to deliver judgement -- a definitive pronouncement was delayed until now.

Meanwhile our so-called democratic process was at work. As early as 1997 the Commons Committee charged with review of regulations concluded that the AFS regulations were actually illegal. However, the Liberal majority on the Committee refused every motion by Cummins -- year after year for six years -- to report this conclusion to the House, as that would have meant the end of the AFS. The government continued to promise modifications, but these were always to be of the technicalities, not the policy.

So it went, year after year. The situation on the ground was terrible. Attempts to protest were frustrated. Attempts to work through Parliament were smothered. The system wasn't working, until a judge cut the knot.

This is not how things should work. More than 5,000 fishermen had to spend $1.5-million of their own money to establish a principle that one would have thought Martin Luther King and Nelson Mandela had established long ago.

The situation is not over yet. The AFS has been suspended for now, but it may be back. As a practical matter native fishing will simply not be effectively supervised this summer to keep a lid on things.

And the federal government may look for loopholes in the Kitchen judgment or it may appeal, but if Ottawa is smart it will say "thank you" and look to the future where more imaginative solutions do exist.

Gordon Gibson is a Vancouver commentator. ggibson@bc-home.com

A can of worms

Once again, a conflict pitting aboriginal against non-aboriginal is in the news.

Earlier this week, B.C. Provincial Court Judge William Kitchen dismissed charges against a group of non-aboriginal fishermen who had challenged Ottawa's Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy by fishing on the Fraser River on a day designated for aboriginals only. Judge Kitchen ruled that the federal fisheries strategy was government-sanctioned racial discrimination -- and a violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In ruling thus, he has cast doubt on the fishing provisions of the Nisga'a Treaty, other proposed West Coast treaties, and aboriginal fishing provisions on the East Coast.

In the non-aboriginal fishing community, the decision has been hailed as justice at last, an end to a "race-based fishery." On the other side of the racial divide, aboriginal spokesmen call for the decision to be appealed. They warn of trouble ahead if the decision stands and results in a permanent loss of aboriginal fishing opportunities.

How should we interpret this conflict? In my view, the Indians have the better case.

After spending their lives in the ocean, salmon return to the streams in which they were born, to spawn and to die. For millenniums, Indians on the Pacific Coast caught returning salmon migrating up-river, en route to spawning grounds. With the arrival of settlers from Asia and Europe, there arose a sea-going small-boat fishery. Since the fish belonged to whoever found them first, the advantage went to the open-sea small-boat fishery.

Over the course of the 20th century, Ottawa encouraged the open-sea fishery and restricted the sea-going fishery.

Salmon are easy -- too easy -- to catch. Over the past 50 years, many salmon stocks have been under threat of extinction. To prevent the fishing fleet from decimating stocks, Ottawa spends a great deal to restrict fishing effort and enhance stocks. In a policy that makes little sense, Ottawa also pays fishermen EI benefits far in excess of premiums.

Finally, Ottawa has repeatedly "bought back" commercial fishing licences to reduce the number of boats on the water. (The most recent buyback exercise, in the 1990s, had an air of desperation as Ottawa sought to avoid repetition of the tragedy that befell the East Coast cod.) In most years of the past quarter century, the private costs of the labour and capital incurred by the fishing fleet, plus the public costs incurred by taxpayers to preserve stocks and subsidize EI payments, have exceeded the value of the salmon caught. Any objective description of the status quo amounts to an indictment of present fisheries policy.

In sum, aboriginals can argue that Ottawa over the previous century destroyed a modest, economically productive, in-river native fishery in favour of a monstrously inefficient substitute that is an ongoing threat to the very survival of salmon stocks.

If not the status quo, then what?

With the exception of the Peace River area in the northeast of British Columbia, modern settlement in B.C. occurred without the signing of treaties.

Following entrenchment of "existing aboriginal and treaty rights" in 1982, Indian leaders insisted they be able to re-establish in-river fisheries. In 1990, the Supreme Court ruled in the Sparrow case that the traditional aboriginal right to fish had never been extinguished.

The court was reluctant to specify the content of the right, except to say that Ottawa maintained the power to regulate for conservation.

Ottawa responded with the Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy, the program that Judge Kitchen has now knocked down.

In the early 1990s, Ottawa, Victoria and most bands agreed to negotiate treaties across the province.

For obvious reasons, fishing rights have been on the table. In decades to come, more and more Indians will probably choose to live off-reserve, but a significant minority will continue to live on-reserve and should be able to do so with dignity, and with reasonable prospects of earning an income. A native fishery is one means to realize the goal.

Canadians are keen to criticize Americans for their failings, but the Americans have found a more equitable and efficient solution than have we to the dilemma surrounding fishing rights.

In a landmark 1974 decision, U.S. District Judge George Boldt cut the Gordian knot. Presented with a conflict between aboriginals and non-aboriginals over Washington state's Columbia River salmon, he decided both parties had a valid claim.

To give certainty to his ruling, he awarded precisely 50 per cent of the harvest to each. Government retained the power to regulate for conservation.

For a decade, the decision was intensely controversial. Three decades later, most conclude that it has worked reasonably well.

Aboriginal fishing employment has significantly expanded. When the dust settled in the 1980s, Americans had a certainty over claims to fish, something obviously lacking in British Columbia. And the need for bands to work out allocation formulas between themselves has required them to develop a managerial and biological expertise that B.C. bands lack.

Aboriginals in Canada look south at the ability of Americans to make decisions, and are legitimately frustrated at the contrast. The Sparrow case was a first step -- a timid, imprecise step. After a decade, high-profile tripartite negotiations have produced several agreements-in-principle -- but no signed treaties that might enable in-river fisheries. (Negotiations for the Nisga'a, the one modern treaty, were independent of this tripartite process.) And now Judge Kitchen has cast down the ad hoc Aboriginal Fishing Strategies inspired by Sparrow.

The legal knots surrounding aboriginal fishing are an apt illustration of the paralysis of Ottawa's aboriginal policy. I hasten to add that blame must be shared.

Victoria and band chiefs share blame for the decade of frustrated expectations in British Columbia's treaty negotiations. Band chiefs accommodate, year after year, a 40-per-cent, on-reserve welfare rate and resist the logical solution of migration off-reserve. Life for urban aboriginals is better than for those on-reserve, but it's not good enough.

The provinces are failing to integrate urban aboriginals into the fabric of regional economies.

In particular, they are giving low priority to the problems among aboriginal students, who are dropping out, at unacceptable rates, from both provincial and band-run schools.

Whether they be judges or politicians, Canada needs a few decision-makers like Judge Boldt, prepared to cut Gordian knots in half.

John Richards teaches at Simon Fraser University, and is a fellow-in-residence at the C.D. Howe Institute, which released his most recent publication on aboriginal policy in February.

Les médias font les manchettes

Il fut un temps où interdire l'établissement d'al-Jazira ici aurait été une décision conforme aux valeurs canadiennes. Dans les années 1930, le gouvernement canadien a assujetti la radio à sa réglementation en grande partie pour protéger la souveraineté du pays devant les puissants réseaux américains.

Aujourd'hui, le zeitgeist -- et c'est le cas dans le monde entier, à quelques exceptions près -- est cependant en faveur de la libre circulation de l'information. Toutefois, après les événements du 11 septembre, nous nous devons de distinguer ami et ennemi, tout comme nous le faisons habituellement pour nos politiques d'attribution de visas destinés à ceux qui désirent visiter le Canada. Car, parmi les téléspectateurs visés par al-Jazira se trouvent de jeunes détenteurs de passeports occidentaux qu'Oussama ben Laden essaie assidûment de recruter. Il serait désastreux pour le bien-être du Canada que nous hébergions un jour une base d'attaque terroriste contre les Américains.

Malheureusement, la polémique à propos de l'introduction d'al-Jazira ici donne lieu à un dialogue de sourds. Les journalistes qui ne savent pas un mot d'arabe -- au Québec comme au Canada anglais -- se prononcent sur la question avec ferveur. Les groupes représentant la communauté juive ont pour leur part qualifié al-Jazira de «violemment antisémite», un jugement étayé par quelques exemples effrayants. La fédération arabe canadienne leur a riposté que «les convictions de ceux qui font l'information ne devraient pas être confondues avec celles du diffuseur». Heureusement, ils n'ont jamais opposé cette distinction à des médias canadiens.

Cependant, hormis notre expérience enrichie de quelques problèmes semblables issus du passé, nous ne disposons que d'un ensemble de valeurs et d'une panoplie de lois pour juger. Malheureusement, on y trouve aussi un vide juridique énorme.

Les règlements actuels interdisent la distribution de toute programmation «qui contient des propos offensants ou des images offensantes qui [...] risquent d'exposer une personne, un groupe ou une classe de personnes à la haine ou au mépris pour des motifs fondés sur la race, l'origine nationale ou ethnique, la couleur, la religion, le sexe, l'orientation sexuelle, l'âge ou une déficience physique ou mentale». Cependant, ces règlements ne s'appliquent qu'aux services de programmation offerts par des concessionnaires. À ce titre, les câblodistributeurs ne sont donc pas couverts. Ils sont également à l'abri des articles du Code criminel qui interdisent l'incitation au «génocide» ou n'importe quelle communication qui «favorise obstinément la haine».

Pour ma part, j'aimerais avoir accès à la programmation d'al-Jazira. J'espère que le Conseil de la radiodiffusion et des télécommunications du Canada attribuera aux câblodistributeurs des licences de «catégorie 2», conformément au modèle qui s'applique au réseau américain d'information MSNBC. Le cas échéant, les câblodistributeurs seront priés de combler la programmation avec un certain pourcentage de contenu canadien. Un tel service est offert aux abonnés comme MSNBC-Canada. À titre de copropriétaire de ce service, le câblodistributeur est tenu juridiquement responsable du contenu qui y est diffusé, ce qui devrait aller de même pour al-Jazira.

À titre d'ancien fonctionnaire, je suis avec beaucoup d'intérêt le conflit qui déchire le premier ministre Tony Blair et la BBC, conflit qui a mené au suicide tragique d'un scientifique oeuvrant pour le gouvernement, David Kelly.

À Ottawa, tout comme à Québec, les fonctionnaires ont l'habitude de distiller des «fuites» d'information. Il y a ici une leçon à tirer au sujet des risques et des conséquences qui peuvent résulter d'une telle pratique. Beaucoup de mes anciens camarades présument à tort que les journalistes protègent toujours leurs sources. Peu de journalistes expliquent franchement qu'ils doivent dévoiler le nom d'une source à leurs patrons si ces derniers le leur demandent. Ou encore qu'ils sont peu disposés à aller en prison si jamais le contenu de l'information devait être porté devant les tribunaux. Et que le Parlement ou l'Assemblée nationale ont le pouvoir de contraindre les journalistes à nommer leurs sources.

Cela se produit rarement. Même lorsqu'une histoire est imprécise, peu de gouvernements osent s'attaquer aussi agressivement aux médias. Encore moins avec le succès que le gouvernement de Tony Blair a connu. Et, normalement, les journalistes rapportent au moins l'essentiel d'une histoire avec précision -- tout comme la BBC l'a fait dans ce cas-ci.

Mais la BBC s'est trompée sur un détail important. Le bureau de M. Blair n'a pas demandé l'insertion directe d'un mensonge dans les rapports des services de renseignement. Et Alastair Campbell, un spinmeister extraordinaire, s'est saisi de cette erreur pour préparer la contre-attaque du gouvernement.

La BBC aurait dû rapidement admettre son erreur. Mais elle a plutôt lancé une bataille farouche contre le gouvernement pour son honneur et son indépendance. Bien qu'elle survivra à affaire, la BBC en sera à jamais égratignée.

M. Blair, lui aussi, survivra. Cependant, qui niera désormais que le fait de raconter des salades, au bout du compte, aura écorché la réputation de son gouvernement et, du coup, l'image des politiciens en général ?

nspector@globeandmail.ca

Norman Spector est chroniqueur politique au Globe and Mail.